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Karesh: Security Transactions
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
COIJvMAN KAZSia*
MORT,GAGIS

No cases of other than general interest in the area of Mortgages
were decided by the Supreme Court in the period under survey.
In a pair of cases brought to enforce chattel mortgages, the defenses
went to the merits and did not substantially involve pure mortgage
law. In Tallevast v. Herzog' the defense was fraud and misrepresentation by the seller in the sale of the property covered by the
purchase-money mortgage in suit. A lower court direction of verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issues raised by the defendant. Defenses of fraud and duress were raised in Thomas and
Howard Co. v. Fowler.2 A demurrer to the answer was sustained,
first, on the ground that the alleged promises made the foundation
of the fraud related to acts to be performed in the future, and,
second, that the facts set out in the answer did not constitute duress.
The sustaining of the demurrer insofar as it touched on fraud was
reversed, the holding being that fraud as to future performance may
lie in an intention not to perform. As to duress, the facts alleged
showed nothing more than a threat to resort to legal proceedings
if security were not given, which the court held, as a matter of law,
was not sufficient to constitute duress.
The rather common mortgage question of the absolute deed intended as a mortgage came.before the Supreme Court in Evans v.
Evans,3 in which a wife who was suing her husband for wrongful
possession of land was met with a defense that the defendant had
conveyed the land to his wife as security for the repayment of
amounts to be advanced by the wife for the payment of a mortgage
indebtedness and the payment of existing and accruing taxes. The
master's report in favor of the husband was reversed by the lower
court, and the action of the lower court was affirmed on appeal. The
court falls back upon the familiar propositions that while admissible
the evidence to convert an absolute deed into a mortgage must be
clear and convincing, and that the presumption is that the instrument (the deed) is what it purports to be, with the burden on the
person seeking to disprove it. 4 In the light of these standards the
0

Professor of Law, University -f South Carolina.

1. 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E. 2d 204 (1954).
2. 225 S.C. 354, 82 S.E. 2d 454 (1954).
3. 85 S.E. 2d 726 (S.C. 1955).

4. Petty v. Petty, 52 S.C. 54, 29 S.E. 406 (1897).
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husband, on the basis of the testimony, failed to make out his case.
Another mortgage case,4 a which involves the conduct of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is, because of overriding trust features,
treated in the survey of Trusts.
SUR4TYSHIP

The period under survey embraces a larger than average number
of Suretyship cases, and some of them are of more than usual interest.

Undertaking in Attachment
In an action by a finance company to enjoin the selling under
execution of an automobile on which the company had a conditional
contract of sale or chattel mortgage, the issue was whether the giving of an undertaking by the automobile owner and his sureties to
secure the release of the car which had been involved in an accident
was a substitute for the res and discharged the lien. In Stephenson
Finance Company v. Burgess,5 the Supreme Court, affirming action
of the lower court, held that under the statute giving a lien to a person who is injured or damaged by the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle and providing for attachment, the lien is not created by the
attachment, and that the function of attachment is merely to seize
the property and place it in custody of the law or court. That being
so, the undertaking or bond for retaking of the property is designed
merely to release the offending property from custody and has no effect upon the lien which came into existence upon the occurrence of
the injury. 6 The court draws the distinction between cases where the
lien is an existing one created by statute and those where the attachment itself creates the lien: in the latter the redelivery bond is
7
a substituted form of security.
Construction of Bond
The question of the scope of a bond required by law, in terms of
those parties for whose benefit it is intended, is presented in Rogers
v. U. S. F. & G. Co.,8 in which a person who had been defrauded
4a. Gardner v. Nash, 225 S.C. 303, 82 S.E. 2d 123 (1954).
5. 225 S.C. 347, 82 S.E. 2d 512 (1954).
6. The principal and sureties at the time the bond was given were solvent but
apparently had become insolvent in the meantime.
The plaintiff's contention in substance was that the lien of the injured party
was lost by the giving of the bond, and that the lien of its contract or mortgage,
which it conceded would have been subordinate if the other lien had subsisted,
was the only lien.
7. Citing Bates v. Killian, 17 S.C. 553 (1882).
8. 225 S.C. 298, 81 S.E. 2d 896 (1954).
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by an automobile dealer in the sale of a car he had no right to sell
sued the surety on a bond which the dealer was required by law to
give to insure the "lawful operation" of his business.9 A demurrer
to the complaint on the ground that the bond was not intended for the
benefit of third parties but was for the sole benefit of the State Highway Department was overruled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute requiring the bond, considered in conjunction
with other statutes regulating the business of automobile dealers,
did not indicate any legislative intent to provide security for members
of the public who might be wronged by a dealer. Although many
bonds required by law to be given to a public body are by their
nature designed to afford individuals direct recourse against the obligors and their sureties, this bond is not one of the kind. The court
uses as a comparison the similar requirement of a bond from liquor
dealers conditioned upon the "lawful operation of the business," and
suggests that the bond thus required is not responsive to damages
caused by a tort which the dealer may commit against an individual.
The case is valuable in that it disabuses the notion, easily conceived,
that bonds called for by law are necessarily to be treated as contracts
for the benefit of third parties.
In U. S. v. Crosland Construction Co.,' ° the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in an appeal originating in the Eastern District of South
Carolina, affirmed a lower court holding 1l that a contractor's payment bond conditioned that "the principal shall promptly make payment to all persons supplying labor and material

. .

." did not cover

withholdings of federal income and F.I.C.A. taxes. The principal had
withheld from wages but had not paid over the taxes to the Government. The basis of the decision is that when an employer withholds
the taxes of the employee and pays him the balance of his wages,
the wage obligation is discharged, and the liability is for taxes arising
independently of the contract covered by the bond. The money which
is due the United States on withholding is taxes, not wages.
The rule that the contract of suretyship is not to be construed
strictissimi juris in favor of a compensated surety was recognized
by the Supreme Court in Greenville Airport Commission v. U. S. F.
& G. Co.,12 but while acceding to the view that ambiguity is to be resolved against the compensated surety, the court stated that the rule
..

. does not mean that the bond of a compensated surety is to be

9. 45 STAT. 1729 (1948), incorporated in substance in §§ 46-91 et seq., CODE
OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
10. 217 Fed. 2d 275 (1954).
11. 120 Fed. Supp. 792 (1954).
12. 86 S.E. 2d 249 (S.C. 1955).
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so construed as to extend liability beyond the terms of the contract,
or as to nullify the plain intention of the parties."
In the present case the plaintiff was obligee under a bond furnished
by a contractor who was to excavate and move a specified quantity
of dirt. The bond was of the usual kind conditioned for faithful performance, for payment of claims for labor and material, and for the
saving harmless of the obligee from liabilities which might be incurred in connection with the performance of the contract or
other such liability resulting from negligence or otherwise ..
The principal contract provided that it was to be performed in accordance with the "Standard Specifications for Construction of Airports," issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which contained a provision that the contractor and his surety should indemnify
the obligee from liability for damages caused by the neglect of the
contractor. The Airport Commission had directed the principal to
move dirt along a route designated by it, and in the moving of the
dirt damage had been caused to a landowner. Action was brought
by the landowner against the contractor and the Commission-the
action against the former being based on alleged negligence in the
transportation of the dirt, which resulted in great quantities of dust
settling on the premises and injuring his home; and the action against
the Commission being based on the alleged unlawful taking of his
property without just compensation. At the trial of the landowner's
action the trial judge instructed the jury to find that if the contractor
had been negligent in the transportation of the dirt, they could find
a verdict against the contractor, and not against the Commission;
and, on the other hand, if they found that the contractor had not
been negligent they could find against the Commission for the pro
tanto taking. The jury found against the Commission alone, awarding damages of $1,200. The Commission paid the judgment and
this action was brought to recover from the surety the amount so
paid.
The Supreme Court affirmed a lower court direction of verdict in
favor of the defendant, the action below being based upon the finding
of the jury absolving the contractor from negligence and upon the
holding that the bond did not cover the unconstitutional taking of
property, unless it resulted from the contractor's negligence. The
appellant's contention in substance was that for any loss however
caused to it the surety was liable.
After restating the rules of construction, the court concluded that
since the liability of the surety is measured by the liability of the
principal, the surety in this case was under no liability because the
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principal was not liable, as the jury had found.13 Moreover, what
the contractor had done was done under the specific instructions of
the commission.
Subrogation
The extensiveness of the right of subrogation is pointed up in
St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Donaldson,14 in which the
priority and privilege of a State for unpaid taxes, protected by a
bond, passed by subrogation to the surety which had discharged the
obligation. The principal while doing business in California had
furnished a bond to that State, written by the plaintiff in this action,
conditioned for the payment of sales and use taxes. The principal
agreed to indemnify the surety. The principal failed to pay sales
and use taxes, and the surety paid the amount of the bond. The
principal removed to South Carolina and the present action was
brought against him to recover the amount paid by the surety on
his account, together with expenses incurred by the surety and for
attorney's fees. The defense was that the defendant had filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy and had received his discharge; that
through oversight the surety's claim had not been listed, but that the
surety knew of the bankruptcy and was on that account barred. The
lower court, on the pleadings, held the surety subrogated to the right
of the taxing authority, which was not affected by the bankruptcy,
and gave judgment for the amount of the bond plus interest from the
date of its payment by the surety, for reimbursement of expenses
incurred plus interest from the time they were made, and for attorney's fees.
On appeal the chief contention revolved about subrogation and its
13. The court notes the exception to the rule of measuring the surety's lia-

bility by that of the principal in pointing to cases where the original contract
is unenforceable because of infancy or other disability, citing Smyley v. Head,
2 Richardson Law 590 (S.C. 1846). The cases generally draw a distinction
between "vices inherent in the contract" and personal defenses of the principal
- such as bankruptcy, infancy, coverture (at common law), the statute of limitations. Where the principal has a defense of the former kind, the defense is
open to surety as well. Thus the surety may avail himself of these defects or
defenses arising out of the principal obligation: want or failure of considera-

tion-Savings Bank v. Strother, 28 S.C. 504, 6 S.E. 313 (1887), cited by the

court; fraud or duress practiced on the principal-

Evans v. Huey, 1 Bay 313

(S.C. 1793); illegality-W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.C. 318, 137

S.E. 820 (1927); excusable impossibility- Ordinary v. Corbett, 1 Bay 328
(S.C. 1793). Similarly, where as here the defense is that there has been no
failure to perform- that there has been no breach- a finding to that effect
in favor of the principal results as well in favor of the surety. Martin v.
Hodge, 87 S.C. 214, 69 S.E. 225 (1910) ; Nelson v. Parson, 187 S.C. 478, 198
S.E. 401 (1938) ; Scott v. Wells, 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E. 2d 400 (1949).
14. 225 S.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 159 (1954).
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consequences. The fundamental argument that the agreement for
indemnity negatived the right of subrogation was dismissed, the court
pointing out that subrogation does not depend on contract.15 Having determined that the right of subrogation existed, the court logically concluded that the nondischargeable quality of the obligee's
claim under the Bankruptcy Act 16 remained and was available to the
subrogee. 17 In so holding the court treated the tax liability as creating a personal obligation the right to enforce which passed to the
surety.
Although on the main aspects of the case the court thus held in
favor of the surety, affirming the lower court in this respect, there
was reversal with regard to the allowability of expenses, interest and
attorney's fees. Although apparently conceding that expenses and
fees were proper items chargeable against the principal, the court
held that they were not rights available to the taxing authority and
hence did not pass by way of subrogation. These claims being contractual in their nature would be barred if the surety, having knowledge of the bankruptcy, had failed to avail itself of the Bankruptcy
Act. As to interest the court held that with respect to the claim based
on the paid taxes and expenses, interest would be allowed only to the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.

15. Citing Powers v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 216 S.C. 309, 57 S.E. 2d 642, 16
A.L.R. 2d 1261 (1950). To which may be added as probably the best case describing subrogation as the creature of equity Gadsden v. Brown, Speers Equity 37 (S.C. 1843). The other South Carolina cases making the same point
are legion.
16. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35-to the effect that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not
release a bankrupt from liability for taxes levied by the United States or any
State, county, district or municipality.
17. The succession by the subrogee to the privileged position of the State or
other governmental unit has been sanctioned in American Surety Co. v. Hamrick, 191 S.C. 362, 4 S.E. 2d 308, 124 A.L.R. 1147 (1939), making available
to the subrogee a longer statute of limitations on a tax claim in favor of the
State. An early case denied subrogation on a claim by a surety against his
co-surety for contribution on a United States customs house bond. Bank v.
Adger, 2 Hill Equity 262 (S.C. 1835).
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